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Key Conclusions:
•

While China has gained influence in Southeast Asia relative to the United States in recent years,
U.S. influence has not been marginalized and remains robust.

•

Southeast Asian states are “hedging”—engaging with China while at the same time working to ensure
the continued presence of extra-regional powers, especially the United States, to balance China’s growing influence.

•

China appears increasingly to see Southeast Asia as its “strategic backyard” and Chinese efforts to expand
its influence in the region are likely to continue.

•

China is bolstering its economic ties with Southeast Asia, pursuing an activist role in multilateral fora
of the region, and working to weaken U.S. security relationships with countries of the region.

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Institute
for Defence and Strategic Studies of Singapore, and the U.S. Army War College conducted a colloquium on Southeast Asia and
American views of China in August 2005 in Singapore. The event brought together analysts and scholars from Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States to examine the economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions of China’s
rise from two perspectives. An abbreviated follow-on colloquium conducted by INR was held in Washington, DC, on November 3,
2005. This brief focuses on summarizing Southeast Asian perspectives on China as articulated by participants at the two events.
Participants rejected the idea of an emerging China-centered regional political order that has marginalized the influence of the
United States, although China has gained influence in Southeast Asia relative to the United States over the past 5 years. Its economic
growth and attentive diplomacy generally have fit in well with the interests of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries and the ongoing Asian efforts to develop multilateral mechanisms to deal with regional and other issues. However, leaders
of the ASEAN member states, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma),
and Vietnam, have demonstrated persistent reluctance to move under China’s sway and are seeking to avoid subservience to its
dominance. The uncertain outlook for political stability and economic growth in China—with possible adverse impact on Chinese
policies in Southeast Asia—is another major reason for ASEAN leaders to avoid overdependence on China and to seek close relations
with the United States and other powers.
No evidence suggests that the ASEAN states are “bandwagoning” with China. On the contrary, plenty of evidence shows that
they are hedging—engaging with China bilaterally and multilaterally—but working to ensure the continued presence of extraregional powers to balance China’s rising power. Key to maintaining this balance of power is the United States. While the United
States may be preoccupied with the “war on terror,” its economic, political, and strategic interests in Southeast Asia far outweigh
those of any other major powers, including China. Indeed, since September 11, 2001, U.S.-ASEAN government-to-government
relations have improved considerably (Burma excepted).

The United States is well positioned to benefit from this
ASEAN hedging strategy. The United States remains much
more powerful than China in Asia and has the added advantage
of being seen by ASEAN leaders as Asia’s “least distrusted
power.” Through attentive diplomacy, backed by meaningful
security and economic incentives for cooperation, the United
States can grow quietly and effectively in influence in Southeast
Asia without presenting an overt challenge to China that would
be counterproductive for U.S. interests in the region.
In the military arena, China probably will not seek to create
formal alliances with its southern neighbors, but it will seek
to enhance its military-to-military cooperation with ASEAN
countries as a means to increase its own influence in the region.
China is a potential long-term military problem for ASEAN
countries but in the short-to-medium term, it is not likely to be a
major military force in the region. Weaknesses exist in Chinese
naval and air capabilities, especially in terms of force projection.
Concerns about Chinese ballistic missile programs might be
justifiable, but these are capabilities that will not be brought to
bear in any scenario involving the projection of Chinese military
power into Southeast Asia.

bolster economic linkages with each of the ASEAN countries and
position China as the region’s economic dynamo and putative
financial backer. Bilateral trade and investment agreements and
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) are means
to this end. Second, nurture and seek leadership of multilateral
fora that excludes the United States—hence, China’s support
for the ASEAN Plus Three/East Asia Summit process. Third,
try to weaken bilateral military-to-military links between
ASEAN members and the United States. Thus, for instance, in
the drafting of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, Beijing proposed a clause that would have
prohibited joint military exercises in the area, clearly aimed at
U.S.-Philippine exercises and the annual U.S.-Thai-Singapore
Cobra Gold exercises. ASEAN ultimately rejected this Chinese
proposal.
China Gains Influence in ASEAN.
Based on recent trade growth with ASEAN, Chinese officials
have built closer political ties with neighboring countries through
effective and often high-level diplomacy that is attentive to the
interests of neighboring Asian governments. Putting aside or
narrowing differences in the interest of broadening common
ground, Chinese diplomacy has been welcomed by most
neighbors.
ASEAN’s comfort level with China has been raised as
a consequence of Beijing’s “smile diplomacy.” Through it,
Chinese leaders stress their country’s “peaceful rise,” reiterating
their respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the
internal affairs of other countries, and offer economic incentives
and aid packages. The ASEAN states point to these and other
developments as evidence that their policy of long-term
engagement with China already has paid dividends, and that
China is an increasingly constructive and responsible player in
regional affairs.

China’s Aim: Reduce U.S. Influence
in the ASEAN Region.
The long-term ambitions of China in Southeast Asia remain
subject to speculation and debate. China’s key strategic aims
in Southeast Asia appear to be two-fold: ensure that there are
no conflicts in the region that would compromise Chinese
security or territorial integrity; and ensure that no external
power wields influence greater than that of China. Beijing’s
long-term objective may not be hegemony over Southeast Asia
but the “Finlandization” of the region, whereby ASEAN states
may remain sovereign, but their respective foreign policies take
account of, and do not challenge, China’s national interests.
During the Cold War, China viewed the Indochina region
and mainland Southeast Asia more generally as its “strategic
backyard.” With Beijing’s South China Sea claims and its
increasing dependence on the sea lanes of communication
through maritime Southeast Asia, the concept of a “strategic
backyard” is likely to grow to encompass the whole Southeast
Asian region.
Despite an interest in reducing American influence in
Southeast Asia, it is not clear that China seeks to fully remove it or
replace the U.S. presence with a Chinese security presence. China
views the U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines,
Thailand, and Australia as anachronistic and has offered its own
“New Security Concept” as an alternative model—but it does not
provide a notion of how to maintain security when discussions
and negotiations fail. The U.S. military is seen within the region
as the guarantor of peace and stability; China does not appear to
desire replacing this critical U.S. role. China’s interests do not
fully align with U.S. interests, but they do not appear to represent
a clear disruption of the status quo in Southeast Asia, either.
China’s leaders appear to have adopted three long-term
strategies to achieve their goals in the ASEAN region. First,

ASEAN: Uncertainty, Hedging and Leveraging
Relations with China.
Nevertheless, ASEAN leaders remain uncertain about
China’s stability and long-term political, military, and territorial
ambitions in the region. They remain on guard against prospects
that the Chinese leadership might adopt more interventionist
policies, a “big brother” approach, toward relatively weak
neighbors to the south. The pervasive ASEAN outreach to the
United States and other powers is designed to hedge against such
an outcome. ASEAN hedging strategies aim to enmesh China
into ASEAN-backed multilateral and bilateral arrangements,
while encouraging other powers to become more actively
involved in Southeast Asian affairs. ASEAN leaders hope to turn
China’s greater engagement and cooperation in regional groups
into arrangements and assurances that will preserve ASEAN
interests in a stable and peaceful regional order.
Senior Chinese leaders are comfortable with the
“ASEAN way,” as it is similar to the iterative and deliberative
decisionmaking process on a number of protracted issues in
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Chinese politics. Chinese leaders and officials pursuing a “winwin” approach to Asian neighbors usually follow policies that do
not require neighboring countries to do things they do not want
to do. Thus, China’s Asian approach focuses on “easy things”
and avoids costly commitments or major risks.
The ASEAN hedging strategy has two operational prongs:
first, the ASEAN states seek to foster a stable balance of power
in the region among the United States, China, Japan, and other
powers. Second, ASEAN states are committed to maintaining
credible armed forces to act as a deterrent against future Chinese
aggressiveness.
The ASEAN hedging strategy probably is aimed not at
producing a multi-polar balance of power because the major
powers involved are not of equal strength and power. Rather,
it looks like a drive for a hierarchic order where the United
States would retain the role as the predominant superpower,
China would play the role of regional great power, and India,
Japan, and South Korea would be second-tier regional powers.
The United States is seen as the largest outside counterweight
to China, but ASEAN states generally seek more diversified
range of contacts, partly to avoid a situation of having to choose
between the United States and China.
America’s advantages in this situation are strong. The
United States has a proven record of being able and willing to
commit significant resources and prestige to protect allies and
friends. The United States is very powerful—a superpower—
but it is far away from Asia, has none of the territorial disputes
and few of the ambitions that characterize China and other Asian
powers, and thus is less distrusted by ASEAN governments.
As with the tsunami disaster, the United States is called upon
and responds repeatedly with economic resources, strategic
reach, and diplomatic means to promote stability and prosperity
essential to most governments in ASEAN. As a result, ASEAN
governments give priority to relations with the United States.

Moreover, in the short-to-medium term, China’s ability
to project significant military power into Southeast Asia is
hampered by limitations in numbers, operating ranges, and
doctrinal developments. China simply does not have the operating
ranges for its airpower to penetrate the region. Any further naval
expansion in the East China or South China Seas is contingent
on the development of Chinese naval aviation. China’s lack of
sufficient sealift and amphibious capabilities also means that it
cannot insert a significant land presence into the region. China
probably can insert a small naval presence in Southeast Asia,
but its limited number of oilers means that this naval presence
cannot be maintained at length. The one arena in which China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) currently possesses effective
power projection into Southeast Asia is with its ballistic missile
arsenal.
China’s ability to penetrate the Southeast Asian arms
market, and thereby exercise a degree of political influence
through the instruments of arms sales, is similarly limited. The
only significant Chinese military sale in Southeast Asia has been
the Jianghu class frigates that it sold to Thailand at “friendship”
prices. Thailand’s Chinese-made frigates spend little time
at sea and are more often than not in dry dock undergoing
maintenance because of the low quality of China’s indigenous
weapons systems. This is a poor advertisement of Chinese
military hardware, and will likely dissuade other Southeast
Asian nations from turning to China as an alternative source of
military hardware.
ASEAN: Varied Approaches to China.
ASEAN governments vary in their approaches to China,
with the Philippines and Indonesia more reserved and Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore in the lead of those seeking close ties
with China. Long-standing distinctions exist between the ways
continental ASEAN states deal with China, versus the maritime
states. The former group has to be more sensitive and generally
deferential to Chinese concerns, given China’s proximity and
easy access, while the latter is more free to follow policies either
favorable or not to China. Those countries in which China has
been able to maximize its political influence share a number of
characteristics: they have sought patronage from China because
of poor relations with the United States and other Western
countries; and they suffer from poor governance and have weak
economies.
For most of the past 25 years, Thailand has been China’s
closest friend in Southeast Asia and has served a bridge role
that facilitated the improvement of relations between China
and ASEAN. Bangkok has been unwavering in its support for
the One China policy. Successive Thai governments also have
barred entry to the Dalai Lama and banned activities of the
Falun Gong movement. At the same time, however, Thailand
has maintained its alliance relationship with the United States as
an insurance policy.
China will likely place greater emphasis on Indonesia,
particularly due to its energy resources and its geostrategic
location along several major sea lanes of communication in the

China’s Military Power in Southeast Asia.
While Beijing will try to weaken U.S. alliances and security
arrangements in the region, it is unlikely that the Chinese
will try to create their own formal system of alliances. Since
the early 1960s, the Chinese have preferred informal security
arrangements (e.g., ententes) to formal alliances, as these will
give it greater flexibility in responding to threats against their
allies while reducing the chances of China being dragged into
unwanted conflict. Rather than alliances, China will probably
seek to enhance its military-to-military cooperation with
ASEAN countries as a means to increase its own influence in
the region. These efforts should include exchanges of senior
military personnel, port calls, and as increasing attempts to sell
arms to ASEAN nations.
Beijing’s strategic objectives suggest that China’s use of
force will be constrained. Beijing is sensitive to the perceived
China threat, especially in Southeast Asia, and it recognizes
that aggressive military action in Asia would undermine the
international environment that China needs to achieve its longterm objectives.
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region. But for Indonesia, the main goal of its China policy is
to maximize economic gain rather than to forge a close political
relationship. The Indonesian elites always have perceived
China as an expansionist and aggressive country. Jakarta sees
China as a rival for influence and even leadership in Southeast
Asia. There is a danger that growing economic links between
China and Indonesia could exacerbate jealousy against ethnic
Chinese Indonesians. All these factors pose significant limits to
China’s influence in Indonesia which will continue to privilege
relations with traditional economic and security partners, such
as the United States, Australia, and Japan.
Singapore has enjoyed a fairly robust political relationship
with China since the mid-1980s. It took the lead in 2004 in
recognizing China as a market economy, prompting others
in ASEAN to do the same. But Singapore wishes to avoid
any suggestion that it is China’s ally or “agent of influence”
in Southeast Asia. Thus, in 2004, Lee Hsien Loong rejected
China’s calls to cancel his trip to Taiwan because it would
have undermined the city-state’s freedom to make independent
decisions and damaged its international reputation. Singapore
also has spurned China’s offer of training facilities for the
Singaporean military on Hainan island, presumably in an attempt
to persuade Singapore to end its current training arrangements
with Taiwan.
The Philippines and China have agreed to establish a
high-level security dialogue, increase intelligence exchanges,
training exercises, and send personnel to each other’s military
academies. China is now the Philippines’ fourth largest export
market, up from 12th place in 2001. China has agreed to supply
the Philippine military with engineering equipment worth $1.2
million. China has adopted a more accommodating stance
over the South China Sea dispute. However, Manila’s political
and security ties with Washington far outweigh those with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and are likely to remain that
way for the foreseeable future.
China’s political influence is strongest in Burma. Although
China is ranked Burma’s third largest trade partner after
Singapore and Thailand, in reality, it is likely to be number one
because of the large and lucrative cross-border trade which does
not appear in official figures. China is the biggest investor in
Burma and also has become Burma’s largest provider of military
aid—an estimated $2 billion worth of equipment, including
tanks, jet fighters, and ships. For its part, Burma provides China
with useful pressure points against India—in the early 1990s,
China reportedly upgraded two Burmese naval facilities along
the Bay of Bengal, and established signals-intelligence-listening
facilities along Burma’s coast. But there are indications that the
military junta may have been trying to reduce its dependence
on China over the past several years. Burma has patched up
relations with India and has diversified its sources of military
equipment to include Russia and Ukraine.
Territorial disputes have been a source of contention
between Vietnam and China for several decades, but
considerable progress has been made. In 1999, the two sides
reached agreement on delineating their common land border,
and in 2000, a similar agreement was reached on the demarcation

of their sea border in the Gulf of Tonkin. While both continue
to dispute sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea, in March 2005 Vietnam signed an agreement
with China and the Philippines to conduct joint seismic studies
in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Hanoi remains
wary of Beijing’s influence and suspicious of its long-term
regional intentions. Vietnam has made a concerted effort over
the past 2 years to improve relations with the United States,
especially security ties.
Since 1997, China has established itself as a major political
and economic player in Cambodia—by nurturing close ties
with Hun Sen, Southeast Asia’s longest serving political leader.
Beijing has become a major provider of economic aid and the
number one foreign investor in Cambodia. China has endeared
itself to Cambodia by canceling all of Cambodia’s debt in 2002,
and by not making its aid depend on accelerating reform of the
civil service and judiciary and ending corruption. Cambodia has
become one of ASEAN’s staunchest supporters of China’s One
China policy.
China competes for influence over Laos with Vietnam. The
close personal ties between Vietnam and Laotian communist
leaders ensure that Vietnam currently maintains the upper hand
in terms of political influence. In the meantime, China’s influence
is growing as it nurtures younger Laotian party cadres through
its large diplomatic presence in Vientiane and by paying for
members of the Lao elite to undertake ideological, vocational,
and military training in China. China is already Laos’ third
largest trade partner (after Thailand and Vietnam) and one of its
top three investors. Over the next decade or so, China is likely
to displace Vietnam as Laos’ closest friend in Asia.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not
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